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 The Compassionate Stoic: Brutus as Accidental Hero 
 
In Julius Caesar, Brutus is a deeply attractive character, not only to his wife, Portia, and his 
friend, Cassius, but even to his murder victim, Caesar, as well as his chief rival, Antony. 
What makes Brutus so appealing, however, is a quality which he himself sees as a moral vice: 
compassion, including with it a sense of civic duty. Despite his initial misgivings, Brutus 
backslides into political engagement: Cassius lures him away from Senecan philosophical 
isolation back into an obsolescent Ciceronian enthusiasm for service to the state. His kind-
heartedness is political, as well as ethical, finding expression in a sense of noblesse oblige. 
He tries to withdraw from public affairs, to “live unknown” like an Epicurean, but he has too 
keen a sense of his responsibilities or what Cicero might call his officia (‘roles, obligations’) 
as a husband, friend, and patriot; he cannot shake his old-fashioned pietas (‘duty, reverence’).  
Even more striking, perhaps, given his ostensible Stoicism, is Brutus’s tendency to give way 
to compassion, like a Christian. Pity is an emotion which he sees, like Seneca, as an 
embarrassing and distracting weakness. Nevertheless, his efforts to maintain a sense of 
command over his own inner life repeatedly break down. When he sees he has hurt his friend, 
Cassius, or his wife, Portia, he yields to a humane and generous desire to comfort them in 
their distress. This unbidden empathy, like his decision to engage in politics, is incompatible 
with his chosen “philosophy” (4.3.143).1 His own ideal self is not the one which Antony 
describes, the Republican hero, animated by concern for the “common good” (5.5.73), but 
instead, the quasi-mythical figure of the Stoic sapiens (‘wise man’): a hero of philosophical 
detachment. 
Effectively, Shakespeare depicts Brutus as torn between two opposed visions of heroism: 
Stoic and proto-Christian. He aims to become an exemplary Stoic sage. But he fails to remain 
indifferent to the imminent collapse of the Roman Republic. He cannot bring himself to 
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alienate his own wife, Portia, or his friend, Cassius. In his concern for other people, Brutus 
reveals an aspect of his character which cannot be reconciled to his philosophical ambition: 
an intransigent streak of kindness. For Shakespeare, as well as his audience, shaped by the 
values of a Christian milieu, Brutus’s deep-set sense of empathy is attractive. It fits the 
Christian model of heroism: Christ’s self-sacrifice for love. For Brutus himself, however, acts 
of pity, including his own, are contemptible. His heroism, insofar as it is analogous to 
Christian heroism, is inadvertent, “accidental” (4.3.144), rather than deliberate, emerging 
despite his own best efforts. His reaction to his wife’s death, especially, stands out as a kind 
of felix culpa, redeeming him as a character from otherwise-insufferable Stoic posturing. 
For a Stoic, love such as Christ’s is not a form of heroism, but a dangerous weakness. As 
Francis Bacon explains, “He that hath wife and children, hath given hostages to fortune.” 
When Brutus grieves for his wife, it humanizes him in the eyes of the audience. To a 
Christian, tears can be noble; Christ himself weeps at the tomb of Lazarus. What Brutus 
wants, however, is to be instead what a Christian would call hard-hearted. As he himself sees 
it, his concern for others’ well-being is not virtuous, but instead, a damning lapse in his effort 
to maintain, at all times, at least an appearance of Stoic constancy. Christian caritas has no 
place in that vision of an ideal self, the remote, self-sufficient philosopher exalted in Senecan 
Neostoicism. There is no room there for political activism; not even for more discrete, 
personal acts of human fellow-feeling. Compassion by its very nature entails a loss of self-
control; a surrender of the emotional autonomy which Seneca, especially, praises as the 
summum bonum. 
Shakespeare invokes older, more civic-minded Roman thought through the figure of Lucius 
Junius Brutus, Brutus’s ancestor, famous as the man who drove out the tyrannical Tarquins: a 
flesh-and-blood character drawn from history, or at least from quasi-historical legend. Within 
Stoic philosophy, however, the hero who represents the ideal self is often described instead in 
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the abstract simply as the sapiens, the ‘wise man’ or ‘sage’. In Shakespeare’s tragedy, this 
figure appears as well, in a sense, in that Junius Brutus is represented by a statue. Reflecting 
on Seneca in his Praise of Folly, Erasmus condemns his ideal sapiens as “a marble statue of a 
man, utterly unfeeling and quite impervious to all human emotion.”2 A statue is a vivid 
symbol of disinterestedness: a visual incarnation of Stoic apatheia.  
Seneca for his part sometimes identifies the figure of the sapiens with specific historical 
individuals: Cato, Socrates. But that identification is pressurized, temporary, and subject to 
doubt. In his essay “On cruelty,” for instance, Montaigne turns against Seneca; after much 
thought, he concludes that Cato and Socrates did not in fact conform, as Seneca suggests, to 
the template of the Stoic sapiens. Even at their most heroic moment, the very instant of their 
suicide, they each felt some touch of some strong emotion. “Witness the younger Cato,” 
Montaigne writes. “I cannot believe that he merely maintained himself in the attitude that the 
rules of the Stoic sect ordained for him, sedate, without emotion, and impassible.”3 
Shakespeare’s Brutus shows signs of the same tension. He describes himself as “with himself 
at war” (1.2.46), “vexed” with “passions of some difference” (1.2.39-40).  
Like Hamlet’s Stoic friend, Horatio, the Stoic sapiens can often come across as a curious 
cipher: a mere blank space, albeit with praise attached.
4
 Typically, for instance, he is 
described apophatically, more notable for what he is not (“passion’s slave” [3.2.72]) than for 
what he is.
5
 Even so, the Stoics introduce him as a convenient shorthand. Even if he remains 
somewhat notional and indefinite, the ‘wise man’ as a placeholder crystallizes their 
theorizing into a personification. Seneca describes the sapiens as “calm” and “unshaken.” He 
has “attained perfection”; his “mind” is like “the superlunary world,” “always serene.”6 The 
figure of the sage also deflects possible charges of hypocrisy. By directing attention to people 
such as Cato and Socrates, Seneca need not present himself as a hero of his own moral 
system. “I hope someday to be a wise man,” he explains, “but meanwhile I am not a wise 
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man.”7 This modesty is a trope which he inherits from his Hellenistic Greek precursors, as he 
reveals in an anecdote about the Stoic philosopher Panaetius.  
 
I think Panaetius gave a charming answer to the youth who asked whether the wise man would fall in 
love: “As to the wise man, we shall see. What concerns you and me, who are still a great distance from 
the wise man, is to ensure that we do not fall into a state of affairs which is disturbed, powerless, 
subservient to another, and worthless to oneself.”8 
 
This habit of speech, however, gives rise to an obvious question. Is the ‘wise man’ wholly 
notional? In the course of human history, has any flesh-and-blood person ever fit this 
category? If not, could anyone ever even conceivably come to exist who might someday, 
somewhere live up to its criteria? A living, breathing hero of apatheia?  
Alexander of Aphrodisias, a Hellenistic opponent of Stoicism, insists that “the majority of 
men are bad.” Nevertheless, he is willing to grant that “there have been just one or two good 
men, as their fables maintain, like some absurd and unnatural creature rarer than the 
Ethiopian phoenix.”9 Even Stoic philosophers themselves, however, sometimes concede that 
the sapiens might not exist. Chrysippus confesses that “on account of their extreme 
magnitude and beauty we [Stoics] seem to be stating things which are like fictions and not in 
accordance with man and human nature.” And he admits, “Vice cannot be removed 
completely.”10 Epictetus also tries to temper expectation. “Is it possible to remain quite 
faultless? That is beyond our power… We must be content if we avoid … a few faults.”11  
Cleanthes is the most optimistic of the Hellenistic Stoics, and even he gives little room for 
hope. “Man walks in wickedness all his life, or, at any rate, for the greater part of it. If he 
ever attains to virtue, it is late, and at the very sunset of his days.”12 
With more confidence than his Greek sources, Seneca insists that it is possible for us to 
perfect ourselves, that is, to free ourselves from passion. However, the feat is extremely 
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unusual. “A good man,” “one of the first class,” “springs, perhaps, into existence, like the 
phoenix, only once in five hundred years.”13 “Perhaps”: even here he hedges his bets. In his 
essay De constantia (‘On Constancy’), Seneca rebukes his friend Serenus for his doubts, but 
then trails off into careful qualifications of his claims. 
 
There is no reason for you to say, Serenus, as your habit is, that this wise man of ours is nowhere to be 
found. He is not a fiction of us Stoics, a sort of phantom glory of human nature, nor is he a mere 
conception, the mighty semblance of a thing unreal, but we have shown him in the flesh just as we 
delineate him, and shall show him – though perchance not often; after a long lapse of years, only one. 
For greatness which transcends the limit of the ordinary and common type is produced but rarely.
14
 
 
Like Seneca’s Serenus, in his Praise of Folly, Erasmus censures Seneca for “removing all 
emotion whatsoever from the wise man.”15 Seneca denies that he makes any such claim: “I do 
not withdraw the wise man from the category of man, nor do I deny him the sense of pain as 
though he were a rock that has no feelings at all.”16 Some things do “buffet” the wise man, 
even though they do not “overthrow” him: “bodily pain and infirmity,” “the loss of friends 
and children,” and “the ruin that befalls his country amid the flames of war.” “I do not deny 
that the wise man feels these things,” he says. “The wise man does receive some wounds.” 
Erasmus thus might seem to misinterpret Seneca. However, Seneca himself is inconsistent. 
At the end of De constantia, Seneca insists that the wise man is not altogether impervious to 
injury. “We do not claim for him the hardness of stone or of steel.”17 Yet this claim is in fact 
precisely the boast that he does make at the beginning of the essay. “The wise man is not 
subject to any injury. It does not matter, therefore, how many darts are hurled against him, 
since none can pierce him. As the hardness of certain stones is impervious to steel, and 
adamant cannot be cut or hewn or ground … just so the spirit of the wise man is 
impregnable.”18 
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Seneca seizes upon two men above all as paragons of Stoic virtue: Socrates and Cato the 
Younger. Montaigne, as well, is fascinated by these two figures, although more sceptical; he 
returns to them repeatedly in his Essays, testing Seneca’s claims about their apatheia against 
his own more grounded sense of human nature, and finally concludes that they were in fact 
prompted by emotion, even when they committed suicide. Shakespeare casts a different 
character, however, in the role of the possible sapiens: Brutus. Brutus combines, so to speak, 
the philosopher, Socrates, with the statesman, Cato. Cicero, Seneca, and Montaigne all 
reference his authorship of treatises on ethics, now lost.
19
 Cicero even dedicates two of his 
own philosophical treatises to Brutus, De finibus (‘On Moral Ends’) and Paradoxa stoicorum 
(‘On the Paradoxes of the Stoics’), citing him there as a friend, a Stoic, and an interlocutor in 
an ongoing, lifelong debate.
20
 Shakespeare shows his version of Brutus reading late into the 
night, just before the battle at Philippi, like Cato reading Plato’s Phaedo, just before his 
suicide, and gives him in his funeral oration the distinctive, staccato “Attic” style associated 
with Stoic philosophy.  
If anyone in Julius Caesar is Seneca’s “phoenix,” a hero of disinterestedness, it is Brutus: in 
his eulogy at the end of the play, Antony exalts him as “the noblest Roman of them all.” The 
Roman people, too, see him, at least at first, as a paragon of virtue. When Cassius tells Casca 
that he might join their party, Casca is delighted. “O he sits high in the people’s hearts” 
(5.5.69), Casca crows.  
 
That which would appear offence in us  
His countenance, like richest alchemy,  
Will change to virtue and worthiness. (1.3.158-60) 
 
The Roman people, they trust, will see his intervention as an expression of his sense of civic 
duty, rather than, as in their own case, an outbreak of spite. As Antony observes,  
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All the conspirators save only he 
Did that they did in envy of great Caesar. 
He only, in a general honest thought 
And common good to all, made one of them. (5.5.70-3) 
 
Antony admires his fallen enemy’s pietas: “a general honest thought.” For Brutus himself, 
however, this same patriotism proves a troubling source of dissonance. The concern for the 
“common good” which Antony praises as the best part of his character cannot in practice be 
reconciled with the Stoic ideal of indifference.   
In his study of the concept of “constancy” in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, Geoffrey Miles 
presents it as divided between a familiar definition as “steadfastness,” associated with 
Seneca, and a less familiar definition as “consistency,” connected with Cicero.21 In his 
treatise De officiis (‘On duties’), Cicero exhorts private citizens to engage in public life, 
taking on and fulfilling their proper “offices” or social roles for the good of the 
commonwealth, rather than remaining in more tranquil seclusion. Giles Monsarrat describes 
this sense of duty to the state as “a far cry from the self-sufficiency of the Stoic sage.”22 
Nonetheless, Miles feels comfortable in describing Cicero as a Stoic.
23
 Cicero does not 
simply disagree with Stoicism, he argues, but instead co-opts it, redefining its core ethical 
ideal of “constancy-to-oneself” as “constancy-to-others.” Constancy becomes a “means to an 
end” rather than an “end unto itself.” “Cicero’s ideal is a politician who has the moral 
qualities of a Stoic sapiens, but who uses them for the good of the commonwealth, rather than 
for his own self-perfection.”24 
Miles is right to see a contrast between Cicero and Seneca, but their differences in this regard 
are not best explained as opposed interpretations of Stoicism. Shakespeare scholar Marvin 
Vawter claims, “The Stoic wise man sees himself as an independent entity unwilling to bind 
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himself to any specific community.”25 Miles agrees, as well as Monserrat. Cicero’s sense, 
however, that even philosophers should engage in politics is entirely in keeping with the 
Stoic doctrine known as oikeiōsis, a term which is not easy to translate; it means, literally, 
“the process of making things home.” Sometimes it is rendered as “appropriation.” According 
to this aspect of Stoic thought, the philosopher should extend his sense of himself outward in 
concentric circles, first to his family, then his city, then his nation; finally, to the entire human 
race, thinking of them as part of himself, so that his natural sense of individual self-
preservation becomes instead a more expansive, impartial concern for every human being.
26
  
The problem in this case is Seneca’s outsized influence on Neostoicism. Seeing him loom so 
large in the Renaissance imaginary, critics focused on Shakespeare and his contemporaries 
sometimes mistake Seneca for a more general philosophical standard, a touchstone of 
classical Stoicism. Compared to his sources, however, Seneca is eclectic and idiosyncratic. 
His occasional exhortations to his friend Lucilius to abandon public affairs are not 
representative of mainstream Hellenistic or even Roman Stoicism, but instead characteristic 
of a rival school of thought: Epicureanism. Seneca’s recurrent praise for a private life of 
leisure and seclusion reflects the Epicurean precept, lathe biōsas (“live unknown”).27  
Seneca is not entirely consistent on this point; his essay De beneficiis (“On benefits”), in 
particular, explaining the importance of reciprocal gift-giving, can be understood, like 
Cicero’s De officiis, as an articulation and re-imagination of the Hellenistic doctrine of 
oikeiōsis.28 On the whole, however, his philosophical prose tends to glorify Epicurean self-
sufficiency.
29
 The attraction of retiring from court life, fraught with anxiety and danger, for a 
more carefree, tranquil life of primitive isolation also appears with great force in his 
tragedies, in the fantasies of protagonists such as Thyestes and Hippolytus. 
In Julius Caesar, Shakespeare illustrates the tension between Senecan Epicureanism and 
Ciceronian Stoicism in the contrast between the statue of Brutus’s ancestor, Lucius Junius 
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Brutus, and the man himself whom that statue represents. Striving to persuade Brutus to join 
his conspiracy against Caesar, Cassius calls this illustrious forebear to mind.  
 
 O, you and I have heard our fathers say 
 There was a Brutus once that would have brooked 
 Th’eternal devil to keep his state in Rome 
 As easily as a king. (1.2.157-60). 
 
Cassius’s opening captures the importance to a Roman patrician such as Brutus of his sense 
of his place in a succession of noble patriarchs. “You and I have heard our fathers say…” 
Sallust writes, 
 
I have often heard that Quintus Maximus, Publius Scipio, and other eminent men of our country were 
in the habit of declaring that their hearts were set mightily aflame from the pursuit of virtue whenever 
they gazed upon the masks of their ancestors … It is the memory of great deeds that kindles this flame, 
which cannot be quelled until they by their own prowess have equalled the fame and glory of their 
forefathers.
30
 
 
Cassius’s final word, “king,” is also well-chosen. As “Brutus once” drove out the last “king” 
of Rome, so now, he hopes, Brutus will help him forestall Caesar’s imminent coronation.  
Up until this point, Brutus has been noticeably still, silent, and cold, like a statue. He neglects 
his usual “shows of love”; his “look” is “veiled”; Cassius complains that his “hand” has 
become “stubborn and strange” (1.2.34-7). Cassius must go to great lengths to spark even the 
slightest “show / Of fire” (1.2.175-6). To help draw Brutus further out of his retreat into 
himself, Cassius hits upon an unusual expedient. 
 
   Good Cinna, take this paper 
 And look you lay it in the praetor’s chair 
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 Where Brutus may but find it. And throw this 
 In at this window. Set this up with wax 
 Upon old Brutus’ statue. (1.3.142-6) 
 
Less than twenty lines later, Shakespeare introduces a new character, as well, “Lucius,” a 
young male attendant. Like Macbeth’s valet, “Seyton,” or Antony’s, “Eros,” the minor 
character’s name is symbolic; carefully chosen to reveal the more central protagonist’s inner 
psychomachia. Most immediately, “Lucius” is derived from lux (Latin, ‘light’), and, 
appropriately enough, when he enters, Brutus asks him to fetch a taper. “Lucius” is also the 
praenomen, however, of “old Brutus”: Lucius Junius Brutus. It is significant, therefore, that it 
is this character, “Lucius,” who brings Brutus the first of Cassius’ letters. Unsigned, the 
letters are designed to appear like missives from the Roman people at large. In addition, 
however, they give voice to Brutus’s sense of his ancestor’s example; his likely exhortation, 
if he were present. Cassius brings “old Brutus’ statue” back to life. “Speak, strike, redress!” 
(2.1.47, 55) Invoking this older model of heroism proves effective in unmooring Brutus from 
his Senecan withdrawal. His response echoes Cassius’s speeches earlier: “My ancestors did 
from the streets of Rome / The Tarquin drive, when he was called king” (2.1.53-4). 
By luring Brutus into this Ciceronian mode of heroism, however, Cassius sets him at odds 
with himself. In his eulogy, Antony praises Brutus for his public-spirited engagement in 
politics, much in the spirit of Cicero’s De officiis. He admires Brutus’s concern for the 
common good. Brutus himself, however, might well balk at this description; he seems to 
want to come across, instead, as a model of Senecan disengagement. Even at the cost of 
alienating his own inner circle, as well as the Roman masses, Brutus aspires to be seen as an 
philosopher, rather than a political hero: a paragon of transcendent detachment. In their 
opening conversation, Cassius complains to Brutus that he seems cold and standoffish. “I am 
not gamesome” (1.2.28), Brutus replies. “I do lack some part / Of that quick spirit that is in 
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Antony” (1.2.28-9). He strives to seem unmoved; much in contrast to Antony, he seems 
almost to pride himself on his own stillness and dissociation. Portia, too, complains that 
Brutus seems distant and devoid of affection. “Dwell I but in the suburbs / Of your good 
pleasure?” (2.1.284-5). What humanizes Brutus, then, and renders him a sympathetic figure, a 
hero despite himself, is precisely his failure at his own set task. He is unable to stick to his 
Stoic pride, and instead gives way to compassion, prefiguring the very different moral world 
of Christianity. As A. D. Nuttall writes, “His love for his wife and his grief at her death, 
‘affections’ Brutus is proud to be able to repress, actually redeem him as a human being.”31 
Under pressure, Brutus occasionally sets aside his performance of Stoic indifference, 
revealing emotions such as pity, grief, and anger. Unfortunately, however, he is only willing 
to let down his guard in private. This concern for his public reputation as a philosopher is 
much of the reason why his funeral oration is not more successful. He is not willing to be 
passionate in public, as Antony is. Instead, he tries to sway his audience through arid, 
impersonal argument. “Censure me in your wisdom” (3.216), he says, appealing to his fellow 
Romans’ faculty of reason. “Be patient to the last” (2.3.12). Conceding nothing to what we 
now might call optics, pausing at no point for any tug at the proverbial heart-strings, Brutus 
then presses hoi polloi with challenging counterfactuals and conditionals, in the manner of a 
present-day analytic philosopher. “Had you rather Caesar were living, and all die slaves, then 
that Caesar were dead, to live all free men?” (3.2.22-4). “If… if then … this is my answer”: 
Brutus’s brusque, interlocking “if… then…” statements call to mind the characteristic sorites 
of Hellenistic Greek Stoics such as Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. “As he were ambitious, 
I slew him.” (3.2.26-7). In his dialogue De finibus (‘On moral ends’), Cicero, master orator, 
complains to Cato about the logic-chopping of the Stoics, gives an example, and rejects it out 
of hand as hopelessly unpersuasive: “‘Everything good is praiseworthy; everything 
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praiseworthy is moral; therefore everything good is moral.’ What a rusty sword! Who would 
admit your first premise?”32  
Antony wins the people’s hearts because Brutus, hindered by a peculiarly Stoic 
squeamishness, resolutely fails to pre-empt his rival’s appeal to pathos. His insistence on his 
own detached logic baffles his audience, which fails to follow his reasoning. His carefully-
cultivated persona of disinterest and scrupulous objectivity comes across as unnatural, even 
repugnant, rather than reassuring. Antony’s tears, provocations, and mingling with the crowd; 
his display of Caesar’s mangled, bloody cloak and corpse: these oratorical masterstrokes are 
left free to fill an emotional vacuum. “I will myself into the pulpit first,” Brutus assures 
Cassius, “and show the reason of our Caesar’s death” (3.1.236-7). “The reason”: how far 
Brutus overestimates the power of such an appeal to reason becomes painfully clear only 
slightly later in the scene, when the plebeians begin to respond to Antony’s patent emotional 
manipulation. “Methinks there is much reason in his sayings” (3.2.109), one remarks. Brutus 
gets no such commendation. Setting aside questions of rhetorical technique, to allow Antony 
to speak at all, even to allow him to remain alive, is a grave tactical error, as Cassius 
recognizes. “The people may be moved” (3.1.234), he tries to warn Brutus. “You know not 
what you do” (3.1.232). Brutus, however, consistently underestimates the power of emotions, 
including feelings such as loyalty or friendship, as well as romantic love.
33
 
As the play progresses, and the Roman Republic collapses into open civil war, all in time is 
not well between Brutus and Cassius. The two generals meet in Sardis after some time apart, 
and Cassius immediately accuses Brutus of betraying his trust. “Brutus, this sober form of 
yours hides wrongs” (4.2.40). Brutus urges Cassius to speak “softly,” however, and retire into 
his tent, outside of sight of their respective armies. “Before the eyes of both our armies here,” 
he suggests, “let us not wrangle” (4.3.43-5). Once he and Cassius are on their own, Cassius 
complains that Brutus ignored his request that Lucius Pella be pardoned, and Brutus accuses 
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him in exchange of “an itching palm” (4.3.10), selling “offices” to “undeservers” (4.3.11-12). 
Cassius responds with indignant protests, and the dispute degenerates into recrimination and 
grandstanding. Cassius threatens Brutus, and Brutus mocks him in return. “There is no terror, 
Cassius, in your threats, / For I am armed so strong in honesty / That they pass me by as the 
idle wind” (4.3.66-8). He, Brutus, will not “tremble,” “budge,” or “crouch” under Cassius’ 
“testy humour” (4.3.44-6).  
In De constantia, Seneca compares the Stoic sapiens to “certain cliffs,” which, “projecting 
into the deep, break the force of the sea, and, though lashed for countless ages, show no 
traces of its wrath.”34 Like these cliffs, or like Caesar, when he calls himself “Olympus” 
(3.1.74), Brutus will not be moved. In his account of the ideal Stoic hero, the hypothetical 
‘wise man’, Seneca explains in some detail how he reacts to others’ anger. He is unruffled, 
disdainful, serene, just as Brutus pretends to be here: “he either fails to notice them, or counts 
them worthy of a smile.” Cassius, however, is cut to the quick by this show of casual 
contempt. “Have you not love enough to bear with me?” (4.3.118) he asks. Seeing that his 
friend is hurt, Brutus drops his frosty pretence. “When I spoke that,” he confesses, “I was ill-
tempered too” (4.3.115). “Much enforced,” he admits he showed “a hasty spark” (4.3.111). 
Put to the test, his “love” for his friend Cassius overrides his Stoicism. 
In his essay “Of books,” Montaigne cites Brutus’s private quarrelling with Cassius as a 
paradigmatic example of the discrepancy between a public persona and a private person.  He 
begins by lamenting the loss of Brutus’s treatise on virtue, “for it is a fine thing to learn the 
theory from those who well know the practice.” Then he doubles back. “Theory” does not 
always correspond to “practice.” “But since the preachings are one thing and the preacher 
another, I am as glad to see Brutus in Plutarch as in a book of his own.” As in Shakespeare’s 
play, one episode in Brutus’s life stand out: “I would rather chose to know truly the 
conversation he held in his tent with some one of his intimate friends on the eve of a battle 
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than the speech he made the next day to his army.”35 Montaigne likely has in mind here the 
same source-text for Shakespeare’s scene, a short passage in Plutarch’s biography of Brutus. 
“[Brutus and Cassius] went into a litle chamber together, and bad every man avoyde, and did 
shut the dores to them. Then they beganne to powr out their complaints one to another, and 
grew hot and lowed, earnestly accusing one another, and at length both fell a weeping.”36 
It may well be the case that Shakespeare was influenced by Montaigne’s musing about Brutus 
in his tent: his quarrel scene seems designed to fulfil Montaigne’s wish. In this case, however, 
Montaigne’s spirit echoes Plutarch’s own.  At the beginning of his biography of Alexander 
the Great, Plutarch famously distinguishes himself from more traditional historians. “My 
intent is not to write histories, but only lives. For, the noblest deedes doe not always shew 
mens vertues and vices, but oftentimes a light occasion, a word, or some sporte makes mens 
natural dispositions and maners appeare more plaine, than the famous battells wonne, 
wherein are slaine tenne thowsande men.”37 Seneca, too, stresses the need to examine 
philosophers’ lives for signs of hypocrisy. “Deed and word should be in accord.”38 
Shakespeare departs from Plutarch’s simpler narrative, however, by suggesting that Brutus 
not only fails to maintain his philosophical composure in private, but also that he deliberately 
tries to cover up that lapse, in order to preserve a public image of himself as a dispassionate 
Stoic. In Shakespeare’s version, Brutus is much more consciously performing the role of a 
Stoic sapiens. He insists that he and Cassius speak inside his tent, for instance, out of earshot 
of their men. 
Brutus’s investment in his own reputation as an exemplary Stoic sage is most obvious, 
however, after this scene, in his reaction to the message from one of his captains, Messala, 
that his wife, Portia, is dead. Reconciling with Cassius after their heated exchange, Brutus 
calls for a bowl of wine: a symbol of self-indulgence and momentary emotional liberty. The 
wine calls to mind, as well, Cassius’ initial accusation, outside Brutus’s tent: “Brutus, this 
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sober form of yours hides wrongs” (4.2.40). Brutus is not as “sober” as he seems, literally as 
well as figuratively. “Wrongs,” moreover, takes on in retrospect an intriguing ambivalence. 
Cassius’ own meaning is that Brutus has wronged him as a friend; he has been unkind, 
unsympathetic. Brutus also hides “wrongs,” however, in a Stoic sense: he is more prone to 
emotional breakdown than he lets on. His studied persona of indifference is “form,” rather 
than “substance”: Cassius’ word “form” aptly suggests at once both a detached and 
unrealized ideal, like a Platonic form, and a hollow shell; an exterior show or pretence, as 
opposed to an authentic interior lived experience. 
Cassius for his part marvels that Brutus lost his temper; Brutus, a man who prides himself 
above all on his emotional composure. “I did not think you could have been so angry” 
(4.3.141). Brutus replies, “O Cassius, I am sick of many griefs” (4.3.142). Cassius is 
surprised at this answer and chides Brutus gently, mostly in jest, for failing to abide by his 
Stoic principles. “Of your philosophy you make no use / If you give place to accidental evils” 
(4.3.143-4). Brutus’s pride is stung by this remark, however, and he responds with a slightly 
disturbing self-aggrandizement, as well as a clarification. “No man bears sorrow better. Portia 
is dead” (4.3.145). Cassius is shocked: again, Brutus’s “sober form hides wrongs” (4.2.40). 
From one perspective, that of a Stoic, he is in the wrong to be troubled by Portia’s death. As 
he admits, he is “sick with many griefs” (4.3.142). From another perspective, however, that 
of human compassion, he is in the wrong not to lament his wife’s death more fully and 
openly. 
Brutus asks Cassius twice not to mention Portia’s death, as if afraid that if he does, he will 
not be able to contain his grief. “Speak no more of her” (4.3.170), he says; and again, “No 
more, I pray you” (4.3.164). Meanwhile, however, Messala and Titinius enter, bearing letters. 
Brutus presses Messala for news about Portia, and Messala tells him at last, reluctantly, that 
“she is dead, and by strange manner.” Without giving any indication that this is not the first 
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time he has heard of her death, Brutus then launches into a brief, startling, and again self-
aggrandizing speech. “Why, farewell, Portia: we must die, Messala: / With meditating that 
she must die once / I have the patience to endure it now” (4.3.189-90). Messala is awed by 
this display of Stoic virtue, and he heralds Brutus straightaway as a paragon of heroic 
indifference. “Even so great men great losses should endure” (4.3.191). Cassius, however, 
knows better. “I have as much of this in art as you,” he tells Brutus, cryptically, “But yet my 
nature could not bear it so” (4.3.192-3). Like the audience, Cassius knows that Brutus is 
adopting a persona here. As T. S. Eliot says of Othello, he is “cheering himself up.”39 He is, 
in fact, deeply affected by Portia’s death; he can barely keep himself from breaking down 
altogether. In order to impress his officers, however, he keeps up appearances. He wants to be 
seen as Stoic sapiens, not as a loving husband. 
Some critics have found the so-called “double announcement” of Portia’s death so puzzling 
as to suggest some sort of mistake, either in the manuscript itself, or in the printer’s shop.40 
According to this account, two drafts of the announcement, an early and a late, were 
somehow both included in the only authoritative source for the play, the 1623 Folio. A detail 
in the second announcement, however, suggests that it was included in full awareness of the 
first. Messala tells Brutus that Portia died “by strange manner,” and Brutus does not ask him 
to explain what he means. It is difficult to believe that Shakespeare meant this passage to 
stand alone. To mention that Portia died “by strange manner” but not explain what that 
manner was would be an uncharacteristic disservice to his audience. Brutus’s ostensible lack 
of curiosity here is not a printer’s accident, but Brutus’s own deliberate deception of his 
officers. It is a ruse, and a revealing one, designed to suggest an incredible, awe-inspiring 
apatheia.  
The audience, however, is supposed to see through Brutus’s set-piece speech; to see it as 
ironic in context. Shakespeare uses the double announcement of Portia’s death, apparent on 
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stage only to Cassius, to show that the “form” of the Stoic sage is at best a fiction: a persona 
which can be performed, like an actor’s role, but which cannot in fact be maintained at all 
times, in private life as well as in public. Shakespeare takes us backstage, so to speak, in 
order to allow us to see the incongruity between the performer and the performance. In 
Cassius’ terms, Shakespeare presents Stoicism as an “art” beyond the scope of human 
“nature.” Behind the façade of the superhuman Stoic philosopher, Shakespeare allows us to 
glimpse a different, more complex, and more plausible character.  In his grief for his wife, as 
well as his kindness towards his friend, Brutus falls short of his own stringent philosophical 
standard. At the same time, however, he becomes a much more attractive human being: a 
hero in a different sense. Shakespeare’s would-be paragon of Stoic indifference turns out to 
be instead, in his very failure at his own set task, an admirable example of Christian 
compassion. 
 
     Patrick Gray 
     Durham University 
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